Afghan President and Indian Prime Minister inaugurating the Dam on June 4, 2016

Background –
The Salma Dam Project on river Harirud in Herat Province in North West region of Afghanistan was originally undertaken by the Afghani local government in the middle of 1970’s and was being constructed by local companies. With the Russian invasion in 1979 the work was stopped and the project was abandoned. During 10 years of Russian occupation the project was completely vandalized and even the little infrastructure (stores, workshop, labor camp etc.) constructed at the project was bombed and destroyed. The Russians left, but after laying mines in the whole area with explosives. The Project site is about 9 km from the Chiste Sharif town which is known as birth place of the famous Sufi saint Moinuddin Chiste who became famous as Khwaja Moinuddin Chisti and died in Ajmer (also known as Ajmer Sharif), India.
All of us who worked on the Salma Dam Project for about 10 years believe that we all survived and returned safely alive due to the mercies and blessings of the great Sufi Saint.
After the departure of the Russian forces in 1989 the country suffered civil wars till 1994 when Mullah Omar in Kandahar formed a group called Taliban’s (students) which soon took on guerrilla warfare. By 1998 they controlled 90% of the country. Their only opposition Northern Alliance (old leaders in Afghanistan) sheltered in the northern mountains consisted of tribes Uzbeks and Turkmens whereas the Taliban’s were Pathani tribes and spoke Pashto. By end of century and early 2000 a fragile truce between Northern Alliance and Taliban broke because of extreme Islamic fundamentalism the Taliban’s followed under the influence of Al Qaida.
The attack in September 2001 by Al- Qaida in the USA brought a new actor in the war scene. Unable to convince Mullah Omar to handover Bin Laden to the USA and the Mullah acting ignorant and helpless to act against Bin Laden, the USA under Bush administration after holding for very reasonable time, attacked Kandahar in October 2001 but Mullah Omar escaped. The ground forces of Northern Alliance, initially hesitant, later joined the US forces that were mainly making air attacks. The Taliban’s were totally destroyed and incapacitated but USA failed in its pursuit to capture Bin Laden and Mullah Omar.
The United Nations took the lead in trying to help Afghanistan towards a more stable political future. The country’s various factions were invited to send delegates to a summit conference at Königswinter, a resort near Bonn. After a week of difficult negotiation, arrangements were in place for an interim government. It is to be headed by the Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai. It is to rule for six months from 22 December 2001. At the end of that period a Loya Girga, or meeting of tribal elders, will be held to decide on the nature of a permanent administration.
Karzai is elected president at the Loya Girga. With stability of a kind restored, more rapidly than anyone had dared to hope, the task came of rebuilding a shattered economy and providing for the millions of Afghan refugees displaced by years of warfare and repression.
The Tokyo Conference in January 2002 under the aegis of UN leaders of major donor countries met to decide on the Redevelopment of Afghanistan. India offered full hearted cooperation in the redevelopment works in Afghanistan and offered to take up the Zarang Delaram road project and the Salma Dam Project by providing hundred percent funding and executing these projects by Indian companies only. The Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India became the funding and implementing agency for both these major projects. The MEA involved the Border Road Organization (BRO) to execute the road project and Water and Power Consultancy Services (Wapcos) to execute the Salma Dam Project. Much later the GOI also committed itself to build the Parliament Building for Afghan Govt. and MEA appointed CPWD as the executing agency.
It is worth mentioning that during the period of 1930 to 1970’s Afghanistan had essence of a national Government and Kabul was known as Paris of Central Asia. In the 60’s and early 70’s several experts in different fields like education, river valley projects, roads etc. went on deputation from GOI to Afghanistan. These experts and professionals created lot of goodwill for India in the hearts of the local people. Some Government Engineers from India worked in the Ministry of Water and Energy of Afghanistan at that time and were familiar with the Salma Dam Project in its early days.
In fact, in 1976 an Afghan Contracting Company had started the work on Salma Dam and this company had appointed Wapcos as their consultants for this project. With very little work done, the Project was abandoned after the Russian invasion in 1979. Also the local don of Herat Province by the name Ismail Khan who became Minister of Energy and Water in Karzai’s government was very friendly towards India. So, all factors favored Salma Dam to be picked by Govt. of India. Strategically also located in North West near Iran – Afghanistan border, the project location suited India to expand its influence in that part of Afghanistan.
Herat city in Herat Province has great history of education and learning and it is famously said that one cannot walk on the streets of Herat without stepping on the grave of a poet or laurete. Herat is famous for producing best quality of Saffron (Kesar).
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The famous blue mosque of Herat reconserved by Aga Khan Foundation.
Saffron fields and saffron flower 

In early 2005, M/s Wapcos advertised for Pre qualifications of Civil Contractors and Joint Ventures under the International Competitive Bidding Procedure (ICBP) by specifying minimum physical and financial criteria.
The following companies and Joint Ventures were Prequalified in mid 2005.
- Hindustan Construction Co., Mumbai. (HCC)
- L & T Ltd., Mumbai. (L & T)
- Gammon India Ltd., Mumbai.(Gammon)
- Salma Dam Joint Venture, Bangalore. (SDJV)
My company SSJV Pvt Ltd., Bangalore and Angelique International Ltd., New Delhi formed the Salma Dam Joint Venture as stated above. Even though SSJV Projects Pvt Ltd. was meeting all the pre qualification criteria on its own, they took on board M/s Angelique International Ltd. as partner in Joint Venture because of AIL’s presence in unknown Afghanistan (for logistic support etc.) and mainly because of good relations of owners of AIL and me. The shares in the Joint Venture were 95: 5 (SSJV: AIL).
The above prequalified companies were allowed to submit technical and financial bids in around October 2005. The following companies participated in the bidding and their financial bids were as under:
- HCC – Rs. 400 crores approx.
- Gammon – Rs. 336 crores approx.
- SDJV – Rs. 263 crores approx.
L & T did not submit any offer. As can be seen from the financial bids companies like HCC and Gammon quoted unreasonably high. Their approach was mainly to
- display their participation in government projects
- loose the bid and honorably get out and
- in unlikely event of winning the tender they will have the satisfaction of making a grand financial kill.
Such was their complacency that none of them even bothered to make a site visit to the project for any tender assessment.
SDJV on the other hand made site visit and worked very hard on the tender with complete seriousness and anxiety and spent substantial sum of money in preparing the offer.
The work was awarded by Wapcos to SDJV by Letter of Award in January 2006 followed by an Agreement dated 9th March 2006.
Salma Dam Project –
The Salma Dam Project consists of the following:
- Clearing and opening of the existing 8.5 m. Dia. 630 m long Diversion Tunnel.
- Coffer dams upstream 13 m high and downstream 19 m high.
- A 107 M high rock fill dam about 500 m long (between the gorges) which was about 550 M wide at the base and tapered to about 12 M at the top. The total quantity of various materials (rock fill, filter, clay etc.) is about 49 lac cum.
- A 66 M high concrete spillway between the above rock fill dam having three gates for water to overflow. The total quantity of concrete is 2.6 lac cum.
- A surface power house with foundations to accommodate three turbines. The total concrete in the power house was about 16,000 cum.
- 6A 200 m long horse shoe tunnel of size 4.8 m dia. for penstock. The total concrete was about 14,000 cum.
- Steel penstock of diameter 4.25 m inside the above tunnel. The total steel in penstock was about 890 MT.
- Hydro-mechanical works consisting of 13 gates (spillway-4 nos., Diversion tunnel-1 no., Irrigation Channel – 2 nos., Power Intake 2 nos. Draft tube – 3 nos.). Total weight of the gates was about 250 MT.
- Gantry cranes 2 nos.(30 T and 15 T)
- Outdoor switch yard and cable trenches leading from power house and dam.
- Operation and Maintenance of installed DG sets in Wapcos colony at Chiste Sharif during the entire contract period.
Mobilization on the Project –
In fact, shortly after the Letter of Award issued in January 2006, an engineer (K Satyanarayana) working on BRO’s road project was killed by the afghan Taliban’s and this sent shivers to all of us. My owners from South India became very nervous and wanted to exit from the project even if it meant forfeiting our earnest money of about Rs. 250 lacs submitted along with the bid. We met senior officers of Wapcos and MEA who gave us confidence and assurance that the unfortunate incident is one of its kinds and cannot be generalized and the Herat region is peaceful etc. To also convince us, we were given home examples of bomb blasts in Karol Bagh, Sarojni Nagar in New Delhi.
But surely this seriously affected in our selection of staff and workers from our existing projects in India. Most of our existing and experienced employees who were earlier willing to go to Salma backed out. Our Sri Mahalik who was one of our best project person and who was involved in preparing the Salma Tender (he did the site visit too, attended all pre tender and post tender meetings with the Wapcos) along with me and our owner was ear marked for Salma totally refused to go as he became very nervous and his family became very worried. No amount of persuasion worked including offering him whatever he could demand. On the contrary, owners sweet hint that “Salma or No where” badly misfired and the loyal Mahalik simply resigned from the company. This was more than enough to demoralize and scare the other selected staff.
So, my owner, two directors and self decided to visit the project site in February 2006 for seeing the conditions ourselves and more for confidence building back home.
As Wapcos wanted to show off to the Afghan’s (who were already getting impatient due to long time lapse between announcements and commencement on ground) starting of the work, we decided to start some earth leveling works in the Switch yard area at least. Good for Construction Drawings for main components like dam and spillway, power house and even switch yard etc. was not ready.
Overtime in the following years, we realized that Drawings became the main issue of delays.
Also very soon everybody realized that the site investigations carried out by Wapcos to prepare the Tender documents proved not only inadequate but totally misleading. Thus continuous revision of drawings became the culture of the Project. Most importantly the materials like river boulders originally thought to be used in dam construction and spillway and other concrete was declared inadequate for the dam and chemically not suitable for concrete works. The whole Project Mechanics as envisaged went for a toss. I will discuss these in details with their consequences in the paragraphs to follow.
We are at present on the topic of mobilization.
So, on Wapcos PD’s (Sri. AP Choudhry, Chief Engineer) great pressure we decided that our local person in Kabul will hire some excavator, dozer, shovel etc. and commence the leveling and grading work in the not so important area of open switch yard. The work started on 18th March 2006 i.e. within nine days of signing of Contract Agreement.
On day one itself, the excavator hit a land mine which exploded. Fortunately the operator of the excavator was unhurt and the machine was mildly damaged. So, the three – four Afghans ran for their lives.
We contacted APC who said Oh, Oh, and Oh! We were later told that there is only one American agency namely UNIMA who is authorized to de-mine such areas and arrangements will be made through our Embassy and GOA to get them to our project. This can take even a month or more as the agency has too much work on hand. Nothing happened and in fact a mountain goat while grazing in the same area stepped on a mine which exploded and blew shreds out of the animal.
The news was more than enough to shake our guts. Our efforts so far to select and convince staff and workers was badly hurt.
The agency could come to project site only around July 2006 and de-mine the site by August 2006.
The project required substantial quantity of explosive to undertake excavation of foundations. APC asked us to give quantities of explosives etc. and addresses of the vendors in India. He was actively in touch with the BRO officials in Delhi and Kabul because for their ongoing road project in Afghanistan, the BRO had shipped explosives from India to Afghanistan via Iran. Explosive being a very dangerous and hazardous material requires umpteen clearances and permissions. More so, when it is being sent to a country like Afghanistan where it can be looted and in all probabilities can land into wrong hands.
While APC was excitedly and enthusiastically working on this dangerous consignment, news came around December 2005 that four containers of explosives belonging to BRO for their Afghanistan project slipped from the open ship deck into the sea away from the Mumbai coast on its journey to Bander Abbas in Iran. There were lots of rumors. Some said it was looted by terrorist (Indian or Pakistan or Arab or Taliban), some said it actually slipped into the sea, some said it was never sent. For some days newspapers were filled with news of the shipment but later the news disappeared.
This badly shook Wapcos and APC and us too.
We told Wapcos that explosive cannot be brought by simple trading and it should be handled at the level of GOI and GOA. They had no alternative but to agree. In the early days of the project we could manage some requirement of explosive for excavation work in power house and penstock tunnels from local black market.
Later when the dam and concrete material was changed from river bed material to rock quarry material the quantity of explosive required became enormous.
Indications were very clear that execution of Salma Dam Project is not going to be easy.
By April – May 2006 our core project team reached site and temporarily stayed in vacant quarters of Wapcos colony in Chiste Sharif which was 9 km from the project site. Our Team Leader, Sri. Sudhir Shetty took no time in setting up our staff quarters, stores, first class field testing laboratory, office and workshop and labor camp in project site. He contacted local vendors in Herat and very quickly developed good relationship with them. He immediately found a young boy named Quais Ahmad in Kabul who was college educated from humble family background and recruited him to do all sort of liasoning works. Under Sudhir Shetty’s guidance and instructions Quais bloomed into a very reliable and honest and resourceful employee. Such was Sudhir’s administration and relationship with people that most of the people whom he employed on the project remained with him till the end of the project. Some people who had to return to India (within these 9 years) due to family issues etc. requested Sudhir to re employ them after they sorted out their problems here.
In contrast, in first 20 months Wapcos changed at least 14-15 project staff including 5 PD’s and Dy. PD’s. These frequent changes totally wrecked the understanding and continuity which is so vital for any project. The new comers denied or feigned ignorance of any understanding or decision taken by the previous officials. The paper work was totally lacking on such matters.
During the implementation of the project which took almost 9 years there were more than twenty occasions in the region when security conditions warranted winding up and return home and nobody under law or contract could have stopped us or even contractually penalized us.
My owners were all the time very worried and scared and naturally felt responsible towards the staff at project site and their families back home. Umpteen times the owner screamed and shouted on Sudhir and me to close down and return and that he will not blame us for any consequences. But Sudhir and his team’s commitment and dedication towards the project was almost like that of a soldier who puts all his energy into the mission he is pursuing which in our case was completing the project and fulfilling the commitment given by GOI to GOA.
All this did not go un-noticed by the locals and senior afghan officials. Other social and charitable works done by our company in the region endeared us to the locals. In fact, the indirect protection we received from the locals proved more valuable than the protection provided by the Afghan forces under the contract.
This, as it comes, shall be evident in my narration in the article.
The Project Works-
The demining of the project area was completed by the specialized agency only by August 2006.
Collection and processing of material for main dam and concrete began in right earnest and we set up crushing and screening plants at Sherkhaj, Dekhan, Salma, Khan E Majnu and Taawiz. These are all villages on the bank of the river. The basic material was boulders and pebbles from the river bed on the upstream side. Starting in right earnest within 7- 8 months almost 100 trucks were deployed in transporting river bed material from the river to the above plants. At least 15 excavators / loaders were positioned in the river bed. The work of the upstream coffer dam started in January 2007. Simultaneously, the removal of more than 30 year old shuttering and staging and scrap and cleaning of silt etc. from the old Diversion Tunnel (abandoned after Russian occupation) was taken up in right earnest.
It is not un-common that some site in-charges (like some field commanders) have a very acute tendency to exaggerate the actual ground conditions while reporting to their bosses in their HO’s. And the site in charge can really go scot free if the boss(s) has no field experience of the kind. APC suffered from a terrible superiority complex (he was after all made in charge of the biggest and first of its kind project in Wapcos) and proved to be a big boast and a show off. This however, very soon led to his downfall and exit.
We later came to know that he had committed some date already to his bosses for the opening of the Diversion Tunnel. So, even before the completion of the u/s coffer dam and on the assumption that the trickling flow in the river will remain like that during the winters (he had old rainfall records from his investigations and he was totally relying on them), he had made up his mind to declare to his bosses opening of the DT on or even before the date he had committed to them. So, even when the coffer dam was about 60% complete he opened the DT. The funny story is that he had shared his strategy with one of his junior. Unfortunately, at that pre-decided time, APC was travelling and was not at site. The junior became smarter and grabbed the initiative and announced the good news directly to bosses in HO and stole the thunder from APC. The junior than informed APC in Kabul who could do nothing except fire the fellow.
The Gods had something else in mind for APC and the project.
Within 2-3 weeks of opening of the Diversion Tunnel, un-precedent heavy flow came into the river from the mountain regions in the upstream and the unfinished coffer dam was washed away and the DT ran to full height for several days. Some of our heavy earth machines on the river bed remained in water for several days and some machines on the left bank remained marooned for several weeks. Miscreants stole away parts from the machines which were marooned on the left bank.
APC came on the defensive and was all the time flashing the rain fall records he had obtained from Herat to make the Project Report. He wanted to show everything as “force majeure”. But whatever way he interpreted it became very clear that project report prepared by Wapcos was bunkum and un-reliable. However, when SDJV submitted a claim for damages, APC and other officers of Wapcos chose to sit on high seat and kept on shirking, postponing, excusing, delaying and even blaming.
It became very clear that in the role of “Engineers” in the Contract, officials of Wapcos displayed weak knees when taking up the case with ultimate client i.e. MEA or authorities like CWC (Central Water Commission), CSMRC (Central Soil and Materials Research Centre) etc. Wapcos officials even though expressing their sympathies unofficially with our cause would always officially try to kill the cause by arguing that MEA or CWC etc. will not agree. When we sought meetings with these agencies Wapcos avoided, discouraged or even threatened. This was most non professional.
SDJV (particularly our owner who is very fond of possessing the latest) in all its enthusiasm and professionalism purchased latest heavy capacity Volvo Excavators 4 numbers and Volvo dumpers 7 numbers and shipped them from UAE. Within 5-6 months of these machines workings we realized that buying anything latest or sophisticated is not advisable for country like Afghanistan. These machines required computerized servicing / replacement and while there were no facilities available in that country, company’s mechanics / engineers from UAE or neighboring Pakistan or even India were unwilling to travel to Afghanistan. We could keep on harping with the supplier or manufacturer on business ethics or commercial conditions or moral responsibility but who cared to come to the site where life was in danger.
The diesel fuel we purchased from the person and his company was a rogue who was thrust upon us by the local leaders (through pressure built by our consulate and Wapcos). This person troubled us for almost 2-3 years with adulterated fuel (this was also cause of damage to the latest and sophisticated machines) and regular threatening for any delayed payment, complaint etc. Due to his high connections, ordering or censoring upon us by the consulate for release of his payments became a common feature.
Another Afghan company subcontracted by our Partner became so unreasonable, dangerous and hostile that in November 2008 in a local mediation we had to cough huge sum to the blackmailer only to get rid of him.
Whenever we complained to Embassy or Wapcos we were told that these are commercial matters between us and the vendor and therefore they (Consulate / Embassy or Wapcos) cannot help and that we should resolve ourselves. When we confronted the Consulate not to interfere in such mundane and routine matters of payments to our vendors/suppliers we were told that we are giving bad name of India to that country by not paying the poor Afghani.
The mafia ruled.
In a meeting in MOWR in late 2008 we expressed our difficulties and logistic constraints and as usual we were assured that all problems will be resolved. But very sadly even such problems which could have been solved by making few phone calls by the officials remained unsolved. These were like harassment raised by office of Protector of Immigrants, only 15 days Visas issued by Embassy of Afghanistan, requesting Air India to give priority to our consignments, requesting Afghan Customs to realize that the Project is under aid and exempt from duty etc.
Whereas, in the meeting they had made tall promises to even arrange special aircrafts for our cargo or long term work visa for our workers and staff or exemption from POE for workers and staff going to Salma Dam Project or speaking to authorities in Afghanistan for customs etc.
Nothing happened. We struggled and managed to send our cargo in small shipments in passenger airlines, paid everywhere, be it at our establishments or Afghan establishments for priority and ease.
The greed was bottomless and merciless.
First lesson we learnt was that none of any latest equipment will work in Afghanistan. So, Sudhir went all out for old Russian dumpers, trucks, dozers, excavators etc. He found dozens of willing Afghanis who owned these old machines, gave them some financial help to make ready these machines and employed them on contract / hire basis at site. Even though these machines had lower output and were guzzlers on fuel, their reliability was more important. What more anybody will want in a country like that as any comparison between the modern and the old was only for academics?
Also, we quickly learnt that Afghans are good mechanics and operators and the conditions in their country taught them improvisation.
Due to delays on account of mobilization, un-precedent floods, re-work on the coffer dam, absence of drawings of main components like Dam and Spillway and Power House the work at site was restricted to only producing material in crushers and screening plants etc.
Very obviously the cash flow was affected as overheads were mounting and pressure from suppliers of diesel, steel, cement etc. was increasing. We requested Wapcos to settle our claims expeditiously or pay some interim relief against the claims but nobody bothered. At one time claims of around $ 39 lacs were pending with Wapcos. As mentioned before, the diesel supplier who had access anywhere and everywhere complained to the minister, governor, consul general, and ambassador etc.etc. and only then all hell went loose. APC as usual was flashing project schedules, letters etc at us and also to his own superiors.
It sould be mentioned that the banking system in Afghanistan was not at all conducive to business or shall we say non existed. There was one branch of Punjab National Bank in Kabul (which also later closed) where Wapcos and our accounts were opened. Kabul was 1200 km from Herat / Chiste. We being foreign company could not open any account in any Afghani Banks in Herat. On Sudhir’s advice Quais used to transfer funds from PNB, Kabul into some local aquaintances account in bank in Herat who gave us cash to meet our site expenses. Even in desperate emergency at site we could not transfer fund from India to Kabul. Similarly transferring fund from Kabul to India ( to send spare parts or engineering items etc.) was so tedious and which in later years became impossible due to severe scrutiny ordered by USA on remittances abroad to check massive corruption reported against members of the local Government.
No insurance company offered even the normal Contractors All Risk Policy for works in Afghanistan. We only got individual insurances of our staff and workers. Any loss of equipment or material or works was uncovered.
In around November 2006, Wapcos bosses from HO and self and our Director S. Salimath from SDJV and Jain and Goyal from AIL visited project to resolve the problem and cool the Consulate and Embassy who were becoming very agitated at the representations by the diesel supplier.
In this meeting which lasted two days APC was made to totally keep his mouth shut by his bosses. Wapcos decided to pay part rate for the aggregate produced and also pay us advance against the unadjusted Bank Guarantees of mobilization advance lying with them. This helped to clear the immediate liabilities to great extent. The Consul General of India, Herat was apprised of the adverse cash flow and reasons of low output, non settlement of genuine payments and delays in drawings etc.
How much he wanted to understand or appreciate, we do not know.
But very soon APC was moved away from site by Wapcos and one Mr. Tara Chand took over as CGI, Herat. Mr. Tara Chand proved to be a very matured, practical and helpful person who always approached our Sudhir Shetty for ascertaining the complete and correct facts. He very soon realized that if a project is throttled for drawings and decisions and payments then such situations will bind to occur. Within his limitations he definitely improved our impression in the MEA and Embassy and kept pressurizing Wapcos to expedite design and drawings and release payment of our running bills.
The total change in Project Mechanics –
As per contract the main dam was to be built with river bed material (boulders and pebbles) and the requirement was about 49 lac cu metres. Similarly the river bed material was required to produce coarse and fine aggregate for about 1.6 lac cu meters (later increased to about 2.3 lac cum) concrete works.
After extracting about 5 lac cum of river bed material, the required material was not available in the river bed. Now, this most important point of availability of required basic material was totally left unseen by people in Wapcos who made the project report and subsequently the tender. So, as an alternative Wapcos identified two hills near the project site from where rock can be extracted and processed in crushers and screening plants etc. Now extracting river bed material is a much simpler process as compared to quarrying which required blasting etc. Also there was constraint that the hills where blasting will be done for breaking rock should be at least one km away from the main dam foundation as vibrations due to blasting can cause cracks and damages in the rocks under the dam.
Wapcos identified the quarries 1,2,3,4 and 5 amongst these two hills and sent samples to CSMRC in India for tests and approval etc. Simultaneously Wapcos asked SDJV to give its quotation for this new extra item. SDJV quoted its rate for the new item without the cost of explosives required for blasting. It was agreed that Wapcos will supply explosives to SDJV free. After much delay a meeting took place for negotiation of rate and SDJV gave its final price as $22 per cum. Wapcos stuck at $18 per cum.
Time kept passing – Project getting delayed – Contractor over running idle overheads but nobody bothered in Wapcos as they did not have courage to approach MEA.
Ultimately, a delegation of MEA senior officials led by Additional Secretary and Financial Adviser Mr. Bala Bhaskar, Joint Secretary (PIA) Mr. TCA Raghvan from Delhi along with Mr. Jayant Prasad Indian Ambassador in Afghanistan visited the project in March 2008 and he was informed by our Sudhir Shetty at site that the work is almost stopped because of no decision to substitute the river bed material. Mr. Bala Bhaskar asked what the delay was and where the matter was pending. It transpired that Wapcos had not even submitted the report / proposal / budget etc. of this new item. Mr. Bala Bhaskar asked Wapcos to put up proposal to him within 7 days and told us that we can consider this as approved. So, the new item of rock quarry was approved at $ 20 per cum.
Inexperience and lack of confidence reflected in every action or decision of Wapcos. Not disclosing factual positions to MEA or avoiding taking up matters with MEA at early stages caused serious problems. Probably because Wapcos had also prepared the Project Report and the subsequent tender documents and contract documents the officials of Wapcos suffered from fear of serious embarrassment and likely censorship if they were to approach the MEA with any changes etc. This hesitation of officials of Wapcos from early stages of the project snowballed and caused avoidable grief for the project and the contractors. For fear of the Contractor informing the short comings to the MEA, we were not invited in any meetings of Wapcos and MEA. This was very non professional approach of Wapcos. It can be checked from records that whenever SDJV were allowed to attend meetings with MEA and SDJV was allowed to be heard, most of the important decisions were taken because MEA could immediately appreciate genuineness of the problem(s).
Whether it was the approval of stone quarry or two part payment of our bills or revision of rates or recognizing the delay in CWC / Wapcos for design and drawings or the inadequacy of Afghan Security or realization of the existence of Mafia of local Vendors – all these were well appreciated after our representation in the limited meetings we were made to attend in MEA and or MOWR. I think that in 9 years of this most dangerous project execution, SDJV was hardly allowed to attend less than ten meetings in site and India.
During the entire execution of the project, Wapcos could never appreciate or understand the spirit of the commitment of Govt. of India to Govt. of Afghanistan. Even being the most important member of the team they never worked like a team.
After the decision of rock quarry the work on the main dam galloped. The decision of the cutoff trench and related drilling and grouting lingered on and on with several experts from CWC and outside requisitioned by Wapcos making visits after visits to the project site. The decision was finally taken in March 2009. SDJV in anticipation had initiated a dialogue with a very reputed and specialist company of Iran to undertake these works. SDJV had also kept the PD, Wapcos in the picture. The Iran company decided to send its highest officials and technical expert (3-4 of them) to have look at site and also finalize the sub contract. Everybody involved technically was informed. The party did not arrive at the expected time. After almost a day passed and no information, the shocking news came that the Afghan Dam commander has arrested them and they are in his custody. Nothing could be more shocking and embarrassing. Later we came to know that this Commander grudged every Irani and even despite their explanations and representation and correspondence shown to him he did not allow them to proceed. The idiot even did not bother to check with Wapcos or us about the visitors. How much apologetic and ashamed we could be?
In consultation with Wapcos we finalized the work order on the Iran Company and very soon the work of drilling and grouting to depths up to 70 M was taken up. This work carried on nonstop for about three months and the cutoff trench at river bed was ready for impervious (clay) layer. Having finished the d & g work so quickly the decision to commence the impervious layer took almost 6-8 weeks after several visits of experts from India.
Before, we further continue with the project work it will be interesting to know about the Afghan Security provided to us and the project and it’s Commander.
Our Security provided by GOA-
Our Security Personal at Project
The expenses towards Project Security were also paid by the GOI as part of the cost of the total Project. But the GOI was not interested to deploy its own forces like CRPF or ITBP or any paramilitary forces for reasons of creating or risking any misunderstanding diplomatically with other neighbor countries. Only the Indian Embassy in Kabul and later the Consulate in Herat was provided with Indian Security force. So, GOI and GOA agreed that the Afghans will arrange the security and GOI will pay for same. Afghan government did not have such large and trained permanent security on its own employment so they decided to outsource it to private agencies. These Private agencies were owned / created by favorites (mostly regional dons and ex army men) and corruption was rampant. These agency recruited men known to their owner mostly from same family, village and Kabila (community). The GOA provided them weapons, uniform and wireless sets.
This Commander was a local don and he secured this contract from his henchman in the Government. He totally misused the power and muscle he got by creating a large force of about 100-120 guards. We learnt that he made bloated attendance sheets of more than 200 guards and milked the government for almost 4 years. He procured arms and ammunition more than required. Despite getting vehicles from Government he pressurized us in the name of providing efficient security to give him many vehicles. His vehicles were supplied fuel from our stores free of cost while he was claiming same from his organization. In the beginning of the project our staff and workers travelled between Herat and Chiste (160 km one way) on very bad road. The journey took about 5 hours one way and was back breaking) accompanied by at least two vehicles (front and back) with four gun holding guards in each vehicle. We had to pay un-officially for the guards, driver at $2 per head per day and of course supply the vehicles. We did not bother to even check these expenses as the Commander’s words had become law. He would walk into Sudhir’s office and ask Sudhir to remove a transporter or equipment hirer whom he did not like or who was fallen out of his favor and all in the name of saving our lives and protecting us even at the cost of his own blood. We knew that he was taking money from our transporters and vendors. He settled old and new enmity with his rivals in the region by attacking and killing them with his newly acquired army, weapons and vehicles. On several occasions his untrained guard holding gun, out of his own boredom will fire shots in the sky. Some other guard or guards from other locations will respond with shots and very soon the whole sky would glow with fire and we shall be running for cover in our camp fearing that some shot can take lower trajectory and go stray and hit us. Such fun games would last sometimes more than half hour and would surely burn ammunitions worth thousands of dollars. But who could ask this Commander ? If ever we did not abide by his demands he would very soon create an actual situation to make us realize of not providing him his demand. He would go any extent to prove his point to teach us a lesson and take the shit out of us.
He was worst than a black mailer. He became dangerous and a rogue.
Even in many informal chats with Mr. Tara Chand CGI, Herat we discussed this Commander and Mr. Tara Chand told us that he knows about bloated monthly invoices raised by this Commander but as there is no alternative we have to live with such evil. The PD Wapcos who certified his bills was a virtual puppet in his matters. He pampered and protected the PD with security more than even the President of USA. PD’s convoy consisted of armored vehicle in the lead and at least 3-4 vehicles with 12-15 gunners. I am sure that photos sent home by the PD to his family and friends must have given them very great pride but not realizing that the poor chap was virtually a prisoner.
All this was in the name of saving our lives.
Fortunately, even though very late i.e. after more than 4 years, we heard that this Commander is removed from our Project and now our Security will be looked by Afghan National Army (ANA). The demands of the ANA were almost nothing when compared to those of this Commander and only about 70-80 guards were deployed by them.
Some of the incidents which shook us were as follows:
- Killing of K Satyanarayana of BRO ( February 2006)
- Rocket attack at site ( July 2007)
- Killing of 13 persons in Chiste (Sept 2008)
- Vacating site camp and shifting to Chiste due to worsening conditions (Sept 2008)
- Kidnapping of 5 security persons from site (Oct 2008)
- Militant attack on Sherkhaj check post (Dec 2008)
- Killing of P Simon in Herat (Feb 2009)
- Air sorties and firing on site (July 2009)
- Killing of 12 people in Herat (August 2009)
- Looting and Kidnapping of our trailers and trucks on Herat Chiste road (January 2009)
- Murder of Chiste Sharif’s Oliswal ( like Tehsildar in our country) and 5 others on Herat Chiste road (January 2009)
- Killing of 9 Indians in Kabul (Feb 2010)
- Advisories from Indian Embassy regarding danger to Salma Dam (May 2010)
- Killing of 10 persons in Sherkhaj (Oct 2010)
- Killing of Obe commander and 5 persons on Herat Chiste Road (Oct 2010)
- Cross firing in Clay quarry at Dekhan (Oct 2010)
- Cross firing on the project site (Jan 2011)
- Mine blast on Herat Chiste road on convoy of Project staff (Jan 2011)
- Rocket attack on our camp on 31/8 and 1/9/2011. Simultaneously the Chiste to site road was also mined and even the dam commander could not reach the camp from Chiste to witness the rocket attack.
- Destruction of MTN mobile tower near our dam site on 23.4.2013.
- Kidnapping of staff of marble quarry very near our dam site on 9.5.2014.
- Most lethal, daring and shocking attack on our Consulate in Herat on 23.5.2014.
- Explosion of mine on Chiste Obe road on 27.5.2013.
- Inadequate security reported at our project site on 1.6.2014.
- Kidnapping of Indian national Prem Kumar from Herat on 2.6.2014.
- Security Advisory issued indicating Indian nationals and establishments being targeted on 5.6.2013.
- Remote mine blast in Tawiz check post near screening plant killing 2 security persons on 7.9.2014.
- Land mine blast on chiste heart road near Sunni village killing 4 security persons on 7.9.2014.
- Salma Village School burnt on 17.9.2014.
- Killing of 4 soldiers in Chiste Army camp on 30.9.2014.
- Attack (repeat) on Tawiz check post near screening plant on 14.10.2014.
Uplifting the local people and their surroundings:
We Indians survived and remained alive not due to the security provided by the Afghan forces but firstly due to divine blessings and secondly due to lot of very good work done by Sudhir Shetty and our company for the local people in that whole region.
Chiste Sharif town and sufi’s mosque can be seen at the end of the street.
By depending more on local labor (200 Indians: 600 Afghans) the project gave employment to locals. Sudhir also encouraged several small entrepreneurs to put their old trucks / trailers, dumpers, pickups, buses etc. on rent to the project. In the peak period of the project more than 300 trucks were hauling rock, clay, aggregate etc. in the
Typical Afghan Village on upstream of our river Harirud on which the Dam was built.
project. Workers who were living in nearby villages were provided buses to come to works.
Small shopkeepers thrived. They were ready to bring and supply any food item from Herat or even far away Iran for our camp and kitchen.
Sudhir helped in upgrading / adding / repairing / reconstructing at least 120 mosques in that region. During Ramadan fasting period every day food for Iftar was served to at least 300 -400 persons in different villages of the region.
Schools and madarsas were also helped with upgrading/ adding/ repairing / reconstructing their buildings and playgrounds.
Sheperd and Sheep along the river.
The locals loved Sudhir and Indians for the good work and no anti social element or terror outfit of that region could think of harming us and thereby annoying their own people.
Our CGI and the Indian Embassy also knew about these charitable activities. The local Afghani officials acknowledged and told their seniors in Herat and Kabul.
The goodwill that Sudhir Shetty generated was enormous which we realized when we were invited by the Minister of Energy to take up more similar works directly from them.
The Project Works continued:
The drawings of the power house and spillway were still in the drawing office of Wapcos. The work on the main dam continued with serious shortage of specified clay in the designated quarries prescribed in contract. This was another glaring example of slip shod investigation report prepared by Wapcos for the Project. I will come to this matter later.
Meanwhile, to further prove inadequacy of pre tender investigations, huge shear zones were found during excavation. The decision to tackle these shear zones took ages. The consultant geologist of Wapcos gave solutions but these meant extra cost and time to which Wapcos was shy and embarrassed to inform MEA. Putting the problem under the carpet was the strategy of the moment.
But most damaging was the report of a lowly official of the CSMR posted as quality expert who suddenly declared that the originally envisaged river bed material to be used as coarse aggregate and fine aggregate is chemically not suitable for concreting works. After using river bed material for about 16,000 cum concrete already done, all concreting works was stopped in October 2009.
So, after advice from every tom dick and harry and spending almost 5 months the decision came in March 2010 to use the stone from the rock quarry of same hills selected for main dam rock filling. As mentioned already the extraction of rock from quarry requires blasting (explosives) and is much costly than extraction from river bed. This required re-working of the rates of all items pertaining to concrete.
So, the Project Mechanics as envisaged in the tender / contract underwent a sea change. The materials for main dam (rock quarry instead of river bed), the non availability of specified clay, the material for coarse aggregate of concrete (rock quarry instead of river bed) upset the project cost and time schedule totally. Also, news was seeping from the design office that the quantity of concrete is going to increase by 30-40% from the quantity mentioned in the tender / contract.
The prices of other commodities like diesel, cement, steel etc. ran hay wire in the markets in general. The mafia dictated inputs like transportation, rentals, wages etc. No vendor honored commercial contracts or work orders.
Even though the General Conditions of Contracts were FIDIC, Wapcos never relied on FIDIC because of total ignorance and whims. I think the FIDIC was only adopted out of fashion as this being international work and more to show off to MEA that Wapcos is very update. Such fair clauses like issuing Variation Order for regularizing any changes etc. were not understood or implemented. For example when the river bed material was changed into rock quarry a variation order was enough to regularize it. Instead Wapcos officials started exercise of drafting a supplementary agreement which created so much confusion for themselves that they gave up. The rock quarry work was carried on without any supplementary agreement or variation order. Wapcos officials dreaded to follow the clause on Un-foreseen Conditions as imbibed in FIDIC. Since the original investigation report was also prepared by Wapcos, they were liable to explain to MEA why any matter (be it shortage of river bed material for main dam, or unsuitable quality of river bed material for concreting works, or shortage of clay in designated quarries, or bad geology like massive shear zones found in foundation etc.) was not seen before. They would allow the matter to simmer till the matter become explosive and MEA got desperate and asked Wapcos to put up proposal. Further, we could never understand their strategy that even while seeking MEA’s approval they never disclosed to MEA the full impact (full quantity and cost) and instead took piece meal approvals. Perhaps they followed the saying “zor ka jhatka dhire dhire lage”.
We were totally at God’s mercy.
So, as soon as the original contract completion period of 38 months expired in March 2009 we indicated to Wapcos and MEA are inability to continue further on the project. First, we were not taken seriously then we were threatened for encashment of our Bank Guarantees etc. which was in excess of about INR 25 crores and confiscation of plant and equipment. We were so harassed by then, that we told the Wapcos and MEA to happily go ahead as that would still be a better option to get out of the Project. Then, we were threatened to be blacklisted from any future Government jobs to which we told Wapcos and MEA that we are resigned to our faith in God who will take care of us and we are happy to not do future Government jobs with such insensitive officials any way.
This was around February 2010 when MEA was hammering Wapcos who were hammering us till a new Additional Secretary and FA (Mr. KN Srivastava) took over in MEA. Now KNS had very wide experience and belonged to Karnataka cadre. When he was told by his officials about Salma Project he also came to know about us (SSJV). He had very good impression about our group and company. We had recently completed the Almati Power House in Karnataka and at that time he was probably the Chief Secretary in Karnataka. So, he immediately sent word in Bangalore asking our owner to meet him in New Delhi. Our owner Mr. Manohar Shetty and I met KNS in South Block office of MEA. Having long and practical experience and a very successful carrier in the civil services he immediately understood the problems and mentioned to us that he will have to find ways to resolve the issues because Wapcos is incapable and inexperienced to resolve the issues. Confident that he was, in our presence he phoned the Indian Ambassador in Kabul and agreed with the Ambassador that the Salma Project is suffering due to faulty project investigations / report which is further compounded by indecisiveness and inexperience of Wapcos in implementation of such large project.
He instructed CMD Wapcos to propose formation of a committee of experts who would monitor the Project and give their recommendations and decisions on technical and financial matters which Wapcos is unable to take. The committee was named Project Review and Technical Advisory Committee (PRTAC). It had 9 members under the chairmanship of Mr. K.C.Reddy (retd. Chief Engineer and Secretary, Govt of Karnataka) and the CMD, Wapcos was the Convener of the Committee. Mr. Reddy was a very eminent engineer and KNS treated him with highest respect for his technical competence, honesty, and trouble shooting and straight forwardness. Mr. Reddy was already over 88 years old. The PRTAC was formed in May/June 2010.
The PRTAC had several meetings in New Delhi but all without us. We however came to know that the members of the PRTAC are convinced that the Project Mechanics is totally changed, that the conditions in Afghanistan has deteriorated, that the prices of commodities are on the whims of the local mafia, that the contract price has become unworkable etc. etc. The PRTAC ultimately decided to make visit to the site. So, in month of July 2010 about 25 persons including KNS, Reddy, Mr. Y.K.Sinha Jt. Sec MEA, Sri. G. Mukhopadhyaya Ambassador, CMD Wapcos, 9 members of the PRTAC, Sri. Tara Chand CGI Herat, several officials from Wapcos HO, our owner, officials of BHEL, myself and officials of AIL and Jaguar (transmission line) etc. went to Kabul, Herat and Chiste and to the Project site under tightest security ever seen. More than 200 gunmen were positioned on the hills at the site. We went in two MI 17 helicopters whose door was kept open and a gunner with AK47 was almost hanging out. Our hotel rooms in Kabul and Herat were individually guarded by gunners even though the hotel itself was like a fortress. The PRTAC stayed at site for about 5 hours including site visit, lunch and about one hour meeting in Wapcos office. In this meeting I got an opportunity to speak. Cutting short on several matters, I very clearly told the visitors that unless the rates of major items of works are revised SSJV will not continue on the project. Mr. Reddy said that the PRTAC will examine the case on its merits.
Even the matter of shortage of specified quality of clay in the designated quarries was brushed aside by PD, Wapcos who with help of CSMR staff, one Mr. L.R. Singh who assured the PRTAC of adequate quantity in Dekhan quarry. In less than a month after the visit of the PRTAC the quarry was declared unsuitable for quality. The CSMR staff in fear of being exposed fell seriously sick, left the site and sadly died (RIP).
Ultimately, Wapcos had to revise the specifications.
We learnt that Reddy along with his accompanying technical help requested Embassy for rates of various units of works of the Parliament Building in Kabul being executed by CPWD. Though there was no similarity at all between the Parliament Building and the Salma Dam, he however found out cost of basic materials, labor rates etc.
In Herat, the Governor hosted dinner in honor of the Indian team. In Kabul the Ambassador hosted dinner at his residence. All were invited. Wapcos hosted dinner on departure eve in the lawn of the hotel where all of us were staying but did not invite us. In front of others and particularly in front of government officials, Wapcos officials treated us like clinical untouchables and as if the contractors are not part of their Project team.
It may not be out of place to mention that even after the project was inaugurated by our Prime Minister and the Afghan President in June 2016, M/s Wapcos hosted a lavish party in New Delhi and invited Ministers and MP’s and several VIP’s and even some Afghan officials but totally ignored the Contractors who built the Project. Not that it surprised us but it only shows the very mean and selfish side of theirs. Our owner who by nature is very humble, simple and very spiritual never cared for such formalities but we as normal human beings could not help to notice these acts.
I did not see such strange behavior even while interacting with world renowned consultants in my past assignments. I think most of MEA officials noted this hippocratic behavior of Wapcos officials. I think it had become their working culture to keep the contractor away in presence of others.
I am reminded of one very interesting instance. In the early days of the project, the CMD (Sri. Dutta) of Wapcos held one or two review meetings of the Project with us and during these meetings we took the opportunity to point out various shortcomings and delays in the design and drawings, changes in specifications, law and order situation, visa and customs and logistic issues etc. Dutta could never look into your eyes when speaking to you. He quickly felt frustrated and approached and probably requested the Secretary – Power, Ministry of Energy, GOI to call us and take us to task. Because SSJV was an active contractor on MOE projects (through NHPC and NTPC) Dutta thought that the Power Secretary will be able to screw us or whatever. A very big hype was created for this meeting and high officials from MEA, CWC, and CEA etc. were also invited. The Power Secretary Mr. Anil Razdan was a very pleasing personality. After a lengthy power point presentation of the Project by Wapcos which was fore closed by Power Secretary the Power Secretary talked about the rich heritage of Herat Province (I think he mentioned that his ancestors were from North West Frontier) about the grapes and the dry fruits and the simple and honest people. After a lengthy discourse he asked Wapcos and MEA why at all should this project be taken in that disturbed country and told Wapcos and MEA to get out as soon as possible from the country. Even before any body was asked for reasons for delays or the project matters, he himself mentioned that all involved should work like team without any blame game and shirking responsibility and complete the works on war footing. He looked at his watch and went away.
After the meeting the most humorous reaction came from Jt. Secretary MEA Mr. Raghavan (a South Indian) who had not understood the Urdu or Pashto the Power Secretary had used in his discourse and asked Dutta the purpose of the meeting. I told the JS that most of the problems (big or small) of the Project can best be solved at the level of the Project In charge (Engineer in the Contract) and if he is non decisive and not competent than the Project is bound to suffer and we will have more of such meetings.
A new team of Wapcos was put in place immediately after this meeting. Sri. Amar Kumar, Chief Engineer (at HO) and Sri. AN Prasad, Add CE (posted as PD at site) took over the Salma Project in Wapcos. These people continued till the end and contributed greatly in the making of the Salma Project. Sri Amar Kumar rose to GM-GGM-ED and Sri Prasad rose to CE- AGM-GM-ED. Like during the war, army officers get accelerated and rapid promotions, similarly, most of the Wapcos staff who was involved on Salma Dam Project jumped at least 3-4 levels.
Mr. Dutta retired from service in September 2009 and Mr. RK Gupta took over as acting CMD, Wapcos.
Revision of rates and contract value –
The PRTAC asked SSJV to submit rates for nine major items of work to Wapcos. These were submitted within a week. The PRTAC assigned PD Wapcos to examine and work out the rates of nine major items of works and forward to CWC for examination. The CWC was requested to examine the rates forwarded by PD Wapcos and give their final recommendations to PRTAC. The CWC informed that the rate analysis of each item should be done in the CWC format and guidelines. The PD Wapcos sent his report in September 2010 to CWC after being pulled by PRTAC for delays. The CWC requested time of at least 6-8 weeks to prepare their report after comparing the submission of the SDJV with PD Wapcos and making their own assessment. In between a meeting of PRTAC took place and the Director Estimation CWC (on behalf of CE, CWC who was officially member of PRTAC) informed that he will be ready with the report by next meeting.
So, in the next meeting held in February 2011 and when everyone in the PRTAC and outside the PRTAC was waiting for the recommendations of CWC, this Director Estimation CWC shocked and surprised all present by telling that Contract does not permit any revision of rates and therefore the whole exercise is futile and therefore he has not prepared any report. Both KNS and Reddy got totally upset and told the gentleman that he was given a task to work out the rates and should not bother what is in Contract or not. He has wasted more than two precious months without doing anything. Just then a member (CE from CEA) of PRTAC opined that how is anybody sure that even if rates are revised the project will come through. He complained that as per his information the existing contractor has failed on some other project in India. When asked by KNS and Reddy, he however did not know any details of these projects and also about any peculiar problem of the contractor or project. We were not invited in the PRTAC meeting to put the record straight.
Sadly, the meeting finished in less than ten minutes and all expenses, energies, time spent by PRTAC in last 8-9 months went into the Harirud River on Salma Dam.
Most grieved after us was the Ambassador of India in Kabul and the CGI Herat. Truly he was the custodian of India’s goodwill in that country. He was Mr. Gautam Mukhopadhyaya who knew all ground conditions perfectly.
He visited India around May – June 2011 and the PRTAC again met where the Ambassador was also present and fortunately we were also invited. A normal squabbling with the contractor of his responsibilities in the contract was going on when the Ambassador interrupted and most impressively gave real good piece of his mind to everyone in the room. He said that while you guys are chasing pennies and reading contracts, drinking tea and coffee in cozy atmosphere here kindly come to that god forsaken place and live one night there. He also said that if we don’t complete this project, there are others (Chinese and Pakistanis) who are ready to walk in. He requested KNS to do something about it.
Nobody had batted so far for this Project as the Ambassador played on that day. The house was in pin drop silence.
KNS realized that the PRTAC has become incapable with its uncommitted members from various government departments who had no appreciation of Governments commitment or international affairs. So, he worked hard to form a High Power Committee (HPC) consisting of Secretaries of Ministries of External Affairs, Finance, and Revenue to look into the Salma Dam problem of revision of rates in mid- July 2011. Wapcos was directed to immediately negotiate and finalize the rates of the nine items with the Contractors and put up a proposal without any loss of time. Never before could we see such urgency in Wapcos and after hectic negotiations in the fourth week of July 2011 the MEA in its last meeting on 29/7/2011 called the SDJV for a final word and commitment from the Owners. The MEA informed in early September 2011 that through HPC the proposal will be sent to Cabinet Committee on Approval (CCA) very soon.
Other Contractors of Wapcos like BHEL (M & E) and Jaguar Overseas Ltd. (Transmission Lines) who were in the know of the situation also jumped on the opportunity and represented for their revision of rates too. So, naturally HPC held back our proposal and instructed Wapcos in late October 2011 to put a comprehensive proposal including BHEL, Jaguar.
Our financial position became precarious and liabilities mounted. But continuation of work at project was essential to keep national prestige and more importantly to keep confidence of our officers in the Government who would have just thrown away the proposal at the slightest negative report from site. This period was of enormous tension and struggle for our site staff. Our owners worried for the safety of staff and workers from hostile creditors. We requested Wapcos to release some interim advance against pending approval but Wapcos refused. Often by Wapcos behavior our Owners naturally suspected and dreaded that the proposal of revision of rates may not come through even.
Some other actions and responses towards assurances given in the high level meetings by Wapcos and MEA were also discouraging like the promise of opening of Herat Chiste road, fortnightly helicopter service between Herat and Chiste, improve security at site, release of drawings etc. None of these were implemented and the Project Site was like a dangerous island cutoff from rest of the world.
The road journey Chiste – Herat – Chiste was totally NO NO for Indians. The helicopter availability never followed its schedule. Our people looked in the skies for days and weeks for the helicopter. Most times the Afghan Defense failed to deploy the chopper but several times PD, Wapcos changed schedules to suit his convenience without of course informing us. This was very nerve racking for people. Lot of expenditure was incurred in keeping our incoming staff and workers in hotel in Herat, simply waiting for several days for the chopper. Similarly people journeying to India did not know when they will be lifted. Naturally there was no place for any emergency.
But for themselves, the Wapcos staff including the PD pursued the income tax law (180 days outside country to get exemption) most ritually.
A very funny ( or daring ) instance comes to my mind when our Dy. Manager Pradeep Shetty almost missed his marriage. Pradeep planned to take an announced chopper trip to Herat to reach home in Karnataka at least 8-10 days before his date of marriage. This would have given him sufficient time for preparing for the functions. But days kept on passing hoping that the Chopper will arrive. When he was only left with just sufficient hours to travel Herat – Kabul – Delhi – Bangalore – Village, he and Sudhir decided to take a lifetime risk of disguising him as a sick local Afghan and send him by surface in a vehicle along with our 3 most trusted afghan employees and the most loyal Afghan driver. They decided not to inform anyone, not even the security. In the dead of night the expert driver drove on that terrible track of 160 km even without lights when passing through the villages on route. The road was virtually a death trap. Before dawn they reached Herat Airport. In early days when road transport was allowed it used to take 5-6 hours to cover 160 km. Pradeep’s driver made it in about 4 hours fortunately without anybody breaking their backs. Quais managed Herat Kabul Delhi Bangalore tickets of the same day. Pradeep reached his village early morning of the marriage day. Fortunately, Southies wear simple dhotis for this ceremony which was manageable. The amount of anxiety the bride and parents and families underwent can be imagined.
Coming back to HPC, we understand that the Ambassador was constantly pushing the case. He had also kept the Afghan leadership well informed about the excess cost and requirement of government approvals. We approached him and CGI several times in our distress and they at least gave us sympathy and hope.
HPC finally submitted its report to Cabinet Committee for Approval (CCA of GOI). The CCA gave its approval in January 2013 i.e. almost 18 months after July 2011 when the HPC was formed.
We understand that the CCA before giving its final approval invited Mr. Reddy for his views which Mr. Reddy gave.
The CMD, Wapcos told us several times that the CCA took his unqualified commitment that if the Project is not completed even after the approval he will be made personally responsible.
The project moved fast after this landmark decision of revision of rates. Even before the approval was accorded by the CCA, SDJV in anticipation had equipped the site with massive plant and equipment like batching plants and concrete transit mixers etc. On the front of material collection huge inventory of concrete aggregate, steel and cement was stocked.
The whole revision of rates was to be regularized by a supplementary agreement between Wapcos and SDJV. So, the exercise started with usual earnestness with several drafts being exchange and discussed. But as it happened earlier (in case of rock quarry) the matter lost steam this time too and everybody got busy in day to day work. SDJV carried out works in good faith and Wapcos paid us the revised rates. SDJV however did its duty to remind Wapcos.
After all, the HPC had taken commitment of completing these works in two years after GOI approval is accorded.
But lo and behold. The drawings for the main spillway and the training walls were still not ready / under revision and the work came to standstill soon. More than seven months slipped away with Wapcos promising everyday to issue final drawings and remove the HOLD UPS. We understood that the revised foundation drawing of upstream walls UL1, UL2, UL3 will encroach below the impervious layer of clay of the main dam which was already laid. This would mean that about 20,000 cum of completed work will have to be removed to make way for excavation and construction of the wall foundations. Wapcos neither had courage to rake up the matter with CWC nor come out with an alternate solution. Our owner Mr. Manohar Shetty was in town and we were having courtesy meeting with ED Wapcos when the issue of delay in drawings came up and MS asked the problem. Within a second of understanding the problem MS offered to remove the clay and filter filling if the drawing is ready. MS said that it was very foolish to have lost so much time when this was the easiest and the only solution. We could see the relief on the face of the design engineers who were saved from lot of embarrassment.
Because of lack of field experience, non professional culture of avoiding interaction with the contractors on important site matters, and non transparent approach by the Engineer (Wapcos), the Project was bound to suffer throughout. Most unfortunately the teamwork and the team spirit which is most important for the success of the Project could never be developed by the Engineer who is the key person to set the working culture of the project. Even location of the Project in a disturbed country like Afghanistan was not enough for the Engineer (Wapcos) to realize the importance of building a cohesive team of the stake holders.
As mentioned before, the explosives and detonators for the rock quarry extraction was supplied by Wapcos who under pressure from local leaders placed order on a very influential but rogue local businessman. When these explosives were recd. we noticed that their usage date had already expired or was nearing expiry. We also noticed bad quality due to which experienced few mishaps but fortunately none serious. Our blasters from our Himachal Pradesh projects were excellent in their works. Being a hazardous activity however, we thought it most prudent to report the shortcomings to Wapcos. Most shockingly it was not taken in right spirit. Since, Wapcos did not have courage to confront their influential supplier for the poor quality and expired product, we were instead told to keep shut and even withdraw our letters on the subject. When we told that safety of human life is also important and there should be proper record, we were told that Wapcos want no record in the files for bad quality or outdated product as audit or vigilance can come after them in future. Such was their unseen and non professional approach towards the Contractors workmen and staff.
Enormous quantity of explosive was ordered by Wapcos on this supplier. Huge quantity was stored in site very near our accommodation. Several hundred tons of explosive was also stored in hired warehouses in Herat which remained unutilized for several years. Ultimately when despite notices and warnings of Allied forces to remove the hazardous material was un acted by Wapcos the US Agency destroyed almost about 700 tons of explosive. The news appeared in Afghan media. Nobody knows what happened to audit and vigilance. While excess explosive had to be burnt the quantity of detonators always fell short. At least twice the works of quarrying totally stopped for several days due to non availability of detonaters. So serious was the mismatch in their ordering.
Instead of holding “tool box” meetings at site to resolve the day’s problem instantaneously, the immediate approach was to take protective cover and positions and stance. Thus even most trivial issues used to soon become an “issue” with letters and rejoinders from all directions. The joke was that even letters and rejoinders once became an issue.
The Engineer invariably formed a site committee to examine the issue and submit report to him. In order to give semblance of this site committee (at least by numbers of members in the committee) staff of clerks or administration was also made members. Without having any understanding of the matter, obviously such persons would think that their boss is using them as shield to cover himself or as weapon to achieve his objective. The result invariably was postponements, delays, confusion. All reports were dictated by the Engineer depending upon his level of irritation caused upon him by the daily complaining Contractor at site and HO. The ED at HO and the PD at site had to be constantly reminded by the Contractor. As is common the person at site can easily confuse the person in HO if the person in HO has no field experience.
After one Mr. Aggarwal, DCE (who was on site from beginning years) joined ED Wapcos in HO as his Technical Assistant, the game of site befooling HO reduced. We also noticed the culture of “his man” and “your man” very prevalent in Wapcos which was a very big hindrance in freedom to work.
The period from February 2013 to June 2014 saw record breaking performance in concrete works. The Project achieved a daily production of plus 1000 cum on several occasions. The monthly production of concrete touched as high as 21000 cum. The desired level of +1643.50 (Full Reservoir Level) of the main dam was achieved on August 2014 and the desired level of +1633 (Crest) of the spillway was achieved on September 2014. The Diversion Tunnel could have been closed around October 2014 and the reservoir filling could have commenced. But due to lack of confidence and experience, the closer of DT was kept postponed and postponed. The DT was ultimately closed by Wapcos on July 26, 2015. By this time all the works which were anticipated to be done during the post DT closer were complete. The post closer DT works inside the DT and the downstream works of the plunge pool were speeded up at a pace which unnerved Wapcos and several efforts were made by the mechanical staff of Wapcos to postpone d/s civil works but we did not stop and moved as a perfect team with the penstock people and civil works people.
Fortunately the winters of 2014-2015 began very late and we wanted to continue till the weather allowed. But Wapcos staff had already planned to holiday and leave as per calendar and not as per actual weather at site. We requested even in writing to them about the urgency. But who listens and their HM staff and most of civil staff left in December 2014 on their pre-scheduled flights on long winter break. BHEL staff was ahead of Wapcos. When we closed in end January 2015 we had completed 100% works of the main dam and 97% of the spillway and Power House. In other words only about 10,000 cum of concrete was left out of which 6000 cum was in plunge pool and balance in concrete surround of the penstocks, power house (dependent on BHEL works) and spillway(dependent on HM Works). Most conservatively all this was about 6-8 weeks work.
On many occasions we had this terrible feeling that Wapcos is in no hurry to complete this project and the longer they stay the more it benefits them and their staff. A host of extra items like spillway lift, bridge bearings, spillway and fire fighting pumps, instrumentation etc, were ordered upon us. Though some of them were foreseen long time ago but yet held back. They were ordered now. We speeded completion of these items too along with balance of main works. However, when we had finished all the works including defects list, Wapcos wanted some beautification works like canopies etc. to be made on the main dam which we promptly refused – firstly because such works was not our forte, secondly our demobilization had already begun and thirdly our experience with Wapcos on finalization of rates / payments of extra items was very bad. We also had information that for these small beautification works a local agency was lobbying in Wapcos, so it was perfectly OK for everybody.
Whether it was completion of any important stage of work like drilling or grouting or handing over of foundations or units to BHEL or opening of the DT or closing of the DT or commencement of filling of the reservoir or functioning of the Gates etc. etc. never in the entire implementation of this big project the Engineer ever issued to the Contractor any certificate or acknowledgement. Such was the non professionalism and most probably lack of confidence. However, we tried to keep it in record by issuing letter(s) to Wapcos for the respective event. Even though several side correspondence and events can subsequently establish the successful achievement (s), I could never understand what motives the Engineer had in not issuing handing over / taking over certificates.
Therefore not surprising, even after forcing the Engineer to issue defect list and liquidating them and informing the Engineer of same the Engineer has not issued any formal Certificate for partial completion or substantial completion or on completion.
The Completion of Afghan Dream:
In April 2015 when snow melted and temperatures became workable the first priority was given to massive HM staff and BHEL staff to reach site. All were dependent on the most erratic helicopter service provided by Afghan Defense. There was also an attack at Kabul Airport and it closed for some days. Some of our workers held back for fear.
It may be mentioned that we were requesting Wapcos to issue completion certificate for dam and substantial completion certificate for spillway and to pay our escalation bill (about $11.5 million) which had become more than a year over due and also to officially regularize time extension beyond January 2015.
Sadly, Wapcos resorted to strong arm techniques and told us that unless the three year old supplementary agreement is signed the escalation amount will not be paid. Now as mentioned earlier the onus of finalizing the agreement rested with Wapcos since the time CCA approval was received but Wapcos never bothered. Now, after three years when all the works are almost complete and that too linking it to contractor’s legitimate payments was most unethical.
The MEA and Afghan Government officials had been regularly and continuously visiting site from late 2014 and after seeing the completed dam and almost complete spillway became very hopeful towards the planning of its inauguration etc. The CGI also knew about our problems with Wapcos. Our owners were very upset at the behavior of Wapcos. So, the CGI through Indian Embassy sent a strong report to South Block and the Secretary MEA called the JS, MOWR and Wapcos in May 2015 and fired them. The JS MOWR was a new person in the position and did not understand much about the project. So, he took Wapcos to task who tried to put the blame on SDJV for delay in sending workers to site in the new season. The JS MOWR instructed Wapcos to get SDJV to him. ED took me to JS MOWR on 22.5.2014. The JS was surprised to learn from me about nonpayment of our bills, non regularization of extension of time, non issuance of substantial / completion certificates etc. etc. When he confronted ED Wapcos, the ED said that all these matters are pending with MEA. The JS then really pulled ED for why not mentioning all this in the MEA meeting when Secretary MEA was blasting and embarrassing him. It was very clear that all along ED, Wapcos was playing bluff with MEA, then his own MOWR and of course us. They were holding our year old payments with them to harass us all along and now to use it is a lever to force sign the three year old agreement in back date. Our creditors were getting restless and hostile and we feared for safety of our staff and workers. All the goodwill that we had earned, all the sweat and blood that we put into completing the project, all the stress and tension and panic that the families of our people suffered in India would go waste due to this foolish and unreasonable act of Wapcos. The CGI and Embassy officials assured us that they are behind us all the time. So on assurance of Wapcos to release the $11.5 million we signed the three year ago Supplementary Agreement.
The pressure on PD Salma Wapcos became so enormous from all sides that in July 2015, he personally jumped into waist deep water to supervise closer of the Diversion Tunnel.
He could not resist or postpone or delay any more.
The citizens of Herat celebrated that Indian Independence day on 15th August 2015 by displaying a 100 M long Afghan – Indian flags in the city streets and stadium.
100 M long Afghan India flag taken by citizens of Herat on commencement of filling of the reservoir.
Almost one year after the Project was completed, the Prime Minister of India, Sri. Narendra Modi and President of Afghanistan Mr. Ashraf Ghani jointly and formally inaugurated the project on 4th June 2016. We all understand that to organize and hold such high profile international events it require lots of planning and time, particularly to hold it in a country like Afghanistan where the security aspects over rule everything else. A number of official teams (some said to be most secret, intelligent and high powered) kept visiting the project site to assess the situation for the safety of the high profile leaders and VIP’s and a number of additional works were ordered which were readily taken up and completed. Like we all know, such events are made with several alternate and contingent and emergent plans.
Ultimately, the dignitaries pressed the button from Herat (160 km from our project) and the massive Gates opened and the water flowed from the 107 metre deep reservoir over the spillways of the magnificent Salma Dam which was appropriately renamed as India Afghanistan Friendship Dam. The Government of Afghanistan awarded our Prime Minister Sri. Narendra Modi with their highest civil award (just like our Bharat Ratna) named Amir Amanullah Khan Award. After the function our PM flew out to USA. Sri. Modi with very great pride mentioned the Project in his speech in the US Senate.
The Project cost the Government of India around Rs 1600 crores.
The Govt. of India earned tremendous international goodwill.
President Mr. Ashraf Ghani and several VIP’s came in helicopters to the Dam and watched the whole Project from the dam top. He personally shook hands and congratulated our Team Leader Mr. Sudhir Shetty and instructed his Minister of Energy Mr. Engineer Ali Ahmad Osmani to give more works and whichever works we want.
Team Leader Sudhir Shetty with Afghan President on Dam site on June 4, 2016.
We got our reward for hard and sincere work.
Post script – Already becoming 71 years old and having worked 51 years, I happily concluded my advisory assignment with the company after this project in May-June 2016. My personal and professional relations with senior officials of Wapcos were excellent during the entire duration of the project and I did my best to maintain these relations. Occasionally based on my long professional experience in construction contracts – both in India and abroad – in PSU’s and Private, and compulsion of my age, I tried to share my experience and advice to the concerned officials for resolution of matter(s) but was distressed to see that non transparency, suspicion, one up man ship etc. were often the main hurdle. Inevitably in such situations, all players in the project team end up complaining, unhappy and frustrated. Uncontrolled Time and Cost over Runs are obviously the result.